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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
TAX EXCEPTIONALISM: WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE 
Gene Magidenko* 
Tax law has just not been the same since January 2011. Did 
Congress pass earthshaking legislation affecting the Internal 
Revenue Code? Did the IRS dramatically change regulations? If 
only it were that exciting. Instead, eight jurists sitting at One First 
Street in our nation’s capital transformed tax law in a less bloody, 
but no less profound, way. The thought must have gone through 
many a tax mind – is tax exceptionalism dead? 
THE SUPREME COURT, TAX POLICY, AND MAYO FOUNDATION 
Most citizens, and indeed many lawyers, do not think of the 
Supreme Court as having any considerable role in shaping tax 
policy. The general perception is that tax law originates 
exclusively from the statutory behemoth of the Internal Revenue 
Code and the even larger and drier accompanying body of tax 
regulations. However, anyone who has taken a course in tax law 
(and paid attention) is surely familiar with a number of cases 
having a profound effect on the field. Names 
like Crane, Duberstein, Kirby Lumber, Macomber, and of course 
an entire mélange of Helverings have run through the frantic 
mind of many a law student as he prepared for his income tax 
class examination. 
And since the beginning of this year, there is one more name 
to add to the list – Mayo Foundation.1 In its unanimous decision,2 
                                                   
      *      J.D. Candidate, December 2012, University of Michigan Law School.  I would like to 
thank Professor Douglas A. Kahn, University of Michigan Law School, for opening my eyes 
to the wondrous world of tax law and for his valuable suggestions and comments on this 
post. Any errors or omissions are exclusively my own. 
1.     Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 704 
(2011). 
2.     Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the case. 
J 
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the Supreme Court held that courts should apply Chevron3 
deference to Department of Treasury regulations, just as they 
already do with regulations issued by other agencies. Before Mayo 
Foundation, Treasury regulations were evaluated under the less 
deferential and more nuanced standard established in National 
Muffler.4 But in Mayo Foundation, the Supreme Court relied on 
the practical consideration of simplifying courts’ review of 
regulations. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “We see no 
reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by 
agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our 
review of other regulations.”5 
AN ASIDE ON TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
The reasoning behind Mayo Foundation suggests that tax 
regulations should not be treated differently from regulations in 
other fields because tax law is not fundamentally different. 
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address it, the 
debate over “tax exceptionalism” – the idea that tax law is special – 
has been a hot topic among scholars for years. The recent trend 
has been toward a rejection of tax law’s uniqueness.6 The idea is 
both positive and normative. Positively, opponents of 
exceptionalism assert that there is already extensive cross-
pollination among fields within the law, and it is nonsensical to 
deny the fact. Normatively, the argument goes that legal 
discourse can be enriched through interdisciplinary interaction. 
Foes of tax exceptionalism understandably see much to 
celebrate in Mayo Foundation. The reasoning in the case seems to 
reject the idea that tax is different.7 The Court noted with little 
ado that since the taxpayer had “not advanced any justification for 
applying a less deferential standard of review to Treasury 
regulations,” absent such justification, there would be no reason 
“to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax 
                                                   
3.     See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
4.     See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). 
5.     Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
6.     See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to 
Be Tax Lawyers, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 517 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006). 
7.     See Roger Dorsey, Mayo and the End of ‘Tax Exceptionalism’ in Judicial Deference, 
87 Practical Tax Strategies 63, 63 (2011). 
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law only.”8 But it may be too soon to read tax exceptionalism’s 
eulogy quite yet. 
THE CASE FOR TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayo Foundation – and 
specifically the part quoted above – leaves open the possibility that 
there may be reasons justifying a different approach to tax 
regulations. If someone could advance a justification for tax 
exceptionalism, then perhaps a different standard of review might 
be warranted. I am willing to take on the challenge by suggesting 
two reasons why tax law is different. The first is a constitutional-
origin theory. The second is an eminently practical one. 
The Constitution enumerates those powers that Congress may 
use to “promote the general Welfare.”9 Most of the modern 
regulatory state derives from congressional delegations under the 
Commerce Clause,10 a provision that has effectively become a 
catch-all for government regulatory authority (with some limited 
exceptions) since the Great Depression. The power to tax, however, 
originates from an entirely different source – the Taxing and 
Spending Clause.11 Where Congress has the authority to regulate, 
that power is plenary, so it is tempting to conclude that legislation 
or delegation under one constitutional provision is just as good as 
that under another. Yet more than two centuries of constitutional 
jurisprudence have created a gloss that separates bodies of 
interpretive law governing the various parts of the Constitution. 
When the Supreme Court analyzes a Commerce Clause issue, it 
approaches the matter differently than when it analyzes a taxing 
power question. The Court follows different analytical structures 
and relies on different assumptions. History is important as well. 
Although the Commerce Clause’s interpretation is rather 
mercurial, it has never been de jure amended like the Taxing and 
Spending Clause. In other words, the Supreme Court does not 
approach all constitutional provisions equally, so there is no 
reason why it should assume that delegations under those 
provisions are coequal. 
                                                   
8.       Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
9.       U.S. Const. pmbl. 
10.     See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
11.     U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, expanded by U.S. Const. amend. XVI. 
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Constitutional arguments aside, anecdotal and empirical 
evidence suggest that the tax code is in some ways unique. Ask 
any given American how he views the Internal Revenue Code, and 
you are likely to receive a variety of responses. But the general 
sense is that the tax laws somehow feel “different.” It is telling that 
Title 26 of the United States Code is rarely referred to by its title 
number, with practitioners and laymen alike referring to it as the 
“Internal Revenue Code” instead. And no other set of laws is as 
specific. Tax provisions are by far the most substantively 
complicated and detailed. Congress is constantly adjusting, 
tweaking, and altering the tax code. A brief search through the 
Library of Congress THOMAS portal12 of congressional bills over 
any given session shows that the Internal Revenue Code is the 
most popular target for proposed amendments. 
The fact that Congress so regularly amends the tax laws 
suggests a level of oversight not present in other fields. Although 
some might conclude that this should merit an even-greater 
degree of deference than Chevron,13 I contend that the opposite is 
true.14 Constant congressional attention to the tax code suggests 
that the delegation of authority to the Treasury Department 
is more limited than that to other branches. Congress delegates 
because it cannot manage a vast regulatory apparatus on its own. 
Where Congress constantly oversees and alters a collection of 
laws,15 any delegation must inherently be narrower in scope. 
Congressional intention is more likely to displace agency 
interpretations, requiring a more rigorous analysis of 
reasonableness than Chevron can supply. Accordingly, agency 
actions under such delegation should be subject to greater 
                                                   
12.     Thomas (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). 
13.     The argument would ostensibly be that if Treasury promulgates a regulation 
with which Congress disagrees, Congress is more likely to correct it. That Congress has not 
corrected it implies agreement. This argument is problematic because it is not realistic to 
expect Congress to correct every (or any) improper Treasury regulation through legislative 
action. Indeed, Treasury itself often fails to repeal outdated or superseded regulations. 
14.     Treasury occasionally seeks to reverse losses sustained in the courts by issuing 
regulations. These so-called “fighting regulations” are likely to become more common with 
greater deference post-Mayo. See Clifford M. Sloan et al., Supreme Court’s Mayo 
Foundation Opinion Grants Chevron Deference to Treasury Regulations, The Tax 
Executive, Spring 2011, at 35, 40, available at http://skadden.com/content/Publications/Publi 
cations2434_0.pdf. 
15.     In practice, Congress only nominally oversees the effect of tax laws, while much 
of the actual oversight is in the hands of the Treasury Department. Treasury generally 
monitors the tax code and frequently suggests changes to Congress. No other constituency 
has as thorough or consistent access to the legislative tax apparatus. 
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scrutiny. In the pre-Mayo Foundation era, courts’ capacity to 
overturn unreasonable interpretations of the ever-changing tax 
code by Treasury (by any account a prolific agency when it comes 
to issuing regulations and other guidance) was an important tool 
by which poorly functioning regulations were altered. Greater 
deference to Treasury interpretations removes this corrective 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax lawyers will be discussing Mayo Foundation for years to 
come. The case itself left open more questions than it answered. 
Those will have to eventually be resolved in the courts. Although 
some may see Mayo Foundation as a facial rejection of tax 
exceptionalism, the situation is not quite so simple. The Supreme 
Court is unlikely to overrule the case anytime soon, but the 
distinction between tax law and other fields – a distinction with 
constitutional and logical bases – still has some vitality. 
 
